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This study is an overview of the current condition and principles
on which the Russian power sector has been functioning so far.
This analysis has been carried out against the background of the
changes that have been taking place in the sector since the
beginning of the 1990s. This text also contains a description of
guidelines and progress made so far in implementing the reform
of the Russian power industry, the draft of which was adopted by
the government of the Russian Federation in summer 2001.
However, the purpose of this study is not an economic analysis of
the draft, but an attempt to present the political conditions and
possible consequences of the transformations carried out in the
Russian power sector. The final part attempts to evaluate the
possibilities and threats related to the implementation of the
reform in its present shape. 
T h e s e s
1. The situation in the power sector is one of the major factors
affecting the condition of the Russian state. The Russian power
industry subsidises other branches of the economy as well as
non-production sectors, and allows the continued existence of the
energy-consuming Russian industry. The power sector is also
a creditor of the most profitable export branches, which use their
lobbying abilities in order to obtain preferential energy prices. 
2. The Russian power market is strictly regulated at both federal
and local levels. The state and the regional administrations fix not
only the tariffs but also the scope and manner of energy distrib-
ution. Governors who fix local energy prices treat them as their
own political instrument. Cheap energy ensures popularity and
political support for the regional heads, particularly the support of
the industrial plants who receive it. The populist policies con-
ducted by regional leaders in this field have triggered many local
power crises. 
3. Energy prices in the USSR (and later in the Russian Federation)
have not covered the cost of energy production and transmission
for many years. Since the establishment of the power monopoly
RAO UES of Russia in 1992, the prevailing forms of settlements
for electrical energy were barter exchange and money surrogates.
The share of cash in these operations was minimal. After Anatoly
Chubais, the advocate of the monopoly reform, took over the con-
cernÕs management, the consumption and production of electri-
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cal energy in Russia increased in 1999Ð2001 for the first time after
a dozen or so years of decline, and barter exchange and money sur-
rogates were almost totally eliminated from power settlements.
4. The long years during which the Russian power sector func-
tioned on an almost cash-free basis, when the power market
functioned very inefficiently, resulted in an ever deeper degrada-
tion of the infrastructure and in the sectorÕs undercapacity, owing
to its chronic indebtedness and lack of investment funds. Without
fundamental reform to make the flow of investment possible, the
Russian power industry would have problems to meet the
demand of domestic recipients in the near future, and would
become an impediment to economic growth. 
5. The restructuring of the RAO UESR power monopoly and the
reform of the Russian power industry is acrucial step in the state
modernising programme planned by the Kremlin. The most seri-
ous hindrance to its implementation is the inefficiency of the nat-
ural-resource monopolies (RAO UES, Gazprom and the railways),
resulting from the fact their economic role has been wrongly
defined, and they are thus sponsors of an inefficient and
anachronistic economy.
6. The project concerning the reform of the power sector, which
was torpedoed by influential interest groups, is increasingly tak-
ing on the shape of a compromise. The huge resistance encoun-
tered whenever an attempt is made to restructure the power sec-
tor slows down the implementation of the reform. Nevertheless,
owing mainly to the determination of RAO UESÕ management and
the political importance of the monopolyÕs president Anatoly
Chubais, the reform is making progress. There are many factors,
however, which make a successful implementation of the reform
highly unlikely, at least any implementation which is consistent
with the proposed schedule.
RAO UES of Russia Ð a holding
s t r u c t u r e
RAO UES of Russia Ð Russian Joint Stock Company ÔUnited Energy
Systems of RussiaÕ Ð is the largest producer of electrical and heat
energy in the Russian Federation. The electrical power plants and
heat & power stations which are part of its holding generate over
70% of all the electrical energy produced in the Ru s s i a n
Federation1. The remaining 30% is produced by the electrical
power plants of two regional power companies which are not
included in UESR Ð the Irkutskenergo and Tatenergo Joint Stock
Companies; these are presently controlled by the regional
authorities of Irkutsk Oblast and of Tatarstan2 (just over 15%),
and by nuclear power plants (10Ð14%)3.
RAO UES is also the largest distributor of electrical and heat
energy in Russia, and the almost exclusive owner of anationwide
grid of transmission lines. UESR owns more than 96% of the grid
(including all high-voltage transmission lines and the main lines
connecting regional systems). The power grid on the territory of
the Russian Federation is not asingle structure. The northern and
eastern peripheries such as Kamchatka, Yakutia and Sakhalin are
isolated in the power sense; the flow of energy between Siberia
and the Urals is limited as well (the main high-voltage transmis-
sion line between these regions runs through Kazakhstan). In
addition RAO UES is also the main operator of the Federal Whole-
sale Energy and Power Market (FOREM), which has surpluses of
energy generated in the Russian electrical power plants of all
types (heat, water and nuclear) at its disposal. The monopoly,
which has 80 percent of votes4 in the FOREM authorities, controls
all energy purchase and sale transactions made via FOREM.
The present structure of the power monopoly was formed at the
beginning of the 1990s, during the privatisation of the Russian
C E S  s t u d i e s
Source: www.rao-ees.ru
Production of energy in Russia
Production of energy by RAO UES
Proportion of the energy produced by RAO 
in the total energy production in Russia (in %)
1996
831
615
74
1997
834
607.7
73
1998
827
604
73
1999
845
602
71
2000
876
623
71
2001 (3 quarters)
627
450
72
Table 1. Production of energy by RAO UESR in 1996Ð2000 (in bn kWh)
industry. By virtue of the presidential decrees of August and
November 1992, all electrical power plants in Russia (except for
the nuclear ones)5 were divided among the holding of RAO UES
and the AO-Energos regional power joint stock companies.
Consequently, the Russian power monopoly UESR comprises 
73 regional power systems, controlled (to varying extents) by the
mother holding. RAO UES owns between 25% and 100% of the
shares in individual electrical power plants and local power com-
panies. The monopoly owns also controlling blocks in 32 large
electrical power plants (including 13 water power stations),
which are independent entities within the Russian power market.
The holding is also the sole dispatcher of transmission lines of
a total length of 2.679.600 km covering the whole territory of the
Russian Federation, including over 150.000 km of high-voltage
mains. In total the monopoly controls 96.3% of the Russian
power grid, for which it charges subscription fees from regional
AO-Energos and independent recipients. The charges for trans-
porting energy constitute a considerable share of the holdingÕs
revenues6. Furthermore, the RAO UESR structure includes the
Central Dispatch Board (CDB), the general energy dispatch unit
for the whole domestic power market of the Russian Federation.
Stock ownership
The main shareholder of RAO UES is the state, or more precisely,
the Russian Fund for Federal Property Fund (RFFP). Out of the
block of 52.55% of the shares belonging to the RFFP, one-third
(around 17%) has been distributed among the authorities of the
areas of the Russian Federation. 30.59% of the holdingÕs shares
belongs to foreign shareholders, as do blocks of shares in many
regional companies. The block belonging to non-residents has
long been the cause of dispute in the Duma because, in accor-
dance with the law, this block should not exceed 25%. 16.68% of
the power monopolyÕs shares belongs to Russian investors:
4.96% to personal entities and 11.36% to legal entities. The
majority of the personal entities are shareholders who received
shares in return for privatisation bonds in 1993. This block of
shares is scattered, and in principle its owners do not participate
in general shareholdersÕ meetings. As for the legal entities, the
owner of the largest block (more than 4%) is Gazprom. The
largest block owned by foreign investors (19.96%) was deposit-
ed in the Bank of New York International Nominees7. RAO UES
votes with this block, because in accordance with American leg-
islation banks do not participate in the general shareholdersÕ
meetings of their customers. The Board of Directors of the hold-
ing is composed of 15 persons, who represent three main forces:
state representatives (7 persons), the regional elite (3 persons),
and the RAO UES Management Board (3 persons). The remaining
shareholders Ð non-residents and Russian legal entities whose
representatives sit on the Board of Directors Ð do not constitute
consolidated groups, and have no significant influence on the
decisions taken by this body.
Russian energy market 
and tariff policy
Not all local power companies (AO-Energos) are able to meet the
power demand of the regions in which they operate. This partic-
ularly applies to the poorly industrialised southern regions of the
Russian Federation. There are also regions, such as the Irkutsk or
Moscow Oblasts, where production is higher than the local
demand. The energy surpluses go to the Federal Wholesale Energy
and Power Market (FOREM)8, which includes the Centre for
Agreements and Settlements (CAS), a specialised body whose
task is to determine the quantities of energy which should be, or
could be, provided by producers. The CAS also takes decisions
concerning the details of energy sales contracts; this includes
bringing together recipients and producers by means of adminis-
trative regulations. The institutions of the current Russian power
market (FOREM and CAS) are fully controlled by the producers.
The majority of votes in their authorities (80%) belong to RAO
U E S; the remaining 20% belong to representatives of
Rosenergoatom9. Presently (according to data for 2001) 35% of
the energy generated in Russia is sold via FOREM. Half of that is
produced by RAO UES electrical power plants; 40% is supplied by
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RAO UES, incl.: 
Thermal power stations
Water power stations 
Nuclear power plants 
Irkutskenergo 
Tatenergo 
Other 
Share of total production (%)
72.5
56.7
15.8
9.9
6.0
3.3
8.2
Table 2. Producers of energy in Russia (data from 2000)
Source: www.rao-ees.ru
nuclear power plants, and 10% are surpluses from regional elec-
trical power plants. 
FOREMÕs prices are fixed by the Federal Energy Commission
(FEC), which is subject to the government of the Russian
Federation. Energy prices on the federal wholesale market tend to
be lower than in local power companies. However, access to this
market means that interested parties should have aproper infra-
structure (including transformer stations) as well as the consent
of local authorities. For large industrial enterprises, which pay
higher prices for energy than individual recipients (and in this
way compensate for some of the losses following from underrat-
ed power tariffs for the public), it is practically impossible to
obtain such consent. For example, no aluminium plant has the
right to buy energy within FOREM.
At the regional level, energy prices for the public and for industri-
al entrepreneurs are fixed by Regional Energy Commissions
(REC), which are entirely subject to the local administration.
Therefore it is the governors who decide power tariffs in the
regions. The governorsÕ policy in this field mostly boils down to
underpricing, even when local authorities own the controlling
block of shares in the local AO-Energo. The excessively low tar-
iffs do not provide enough funds to buy fuel for electrical power
plants, which have to limit their energy production due to lack of
fuel. A characteristic feature of the Russian power market is the
huge number of pyramid-like intermediary structures, set up
mostly by local administrations, which thus become responsible
for organising the distribution of light and heat, and collect
charges. This money rarely reaches the power engineers; some-
times asmall proportion of the dues is transferred with delays of
many months or even a few years. According to the estimates of
the holdingÕs trade department, there are anything from afew up
to dozens of intermediary companies in every region of the
Russian Federation. There are over a thousand of them through-
out the country, and they are the debtors with whom RAO UES has
the greatest problems regarding debt collection. 
It is thus apparent that the Russian energy market is strictly reg-
ulated at both federal and local levels, although the criteria of this
regulation are not wholly transparent. The state and regional
administrations fix not only the tariffs but also the scope and the
means of distribution; they decide who will supply energy, how
much and to whom, who is going to pay and how much, as well
as who will receive energy for free (most often because of their
useful political links). 
The electricity prices charged in the USSR, and later in the
Russian Federation, have never covered production costs. Since
the beginning of the 1990s the disproportion (in relation to Soviet
times) has been growing between the rise in electrical & heat
energy prices and the prices of industrial production, particularly
raw energy materials. In the period 1991Ð1999, prices for indus-
trial goods increased 30 times on average; the prices of energy
forms used in electrical power plants (coal, mazout) rose 50
times, whereas electricity prices rose 16.3 times10. The cheapest
fuel is still gas, for which the prices for domestic recipients, reg-
ulated by the state, increased only twelve times during the same
period11. The debts of the largest gas consumer in Russia (RAO
UES) to gas concerns, and the excessive (in the opinion of
experts) share of gas in the production of electrical energy (on
average 64% of the energy generated in thermal power stations
of the Russian Federation; the analogical figure in developed
countries does not exceed 30%) are the causes of permanent
conflict between the two monopolies. For many years Gazprom
has made attempts, with various levels of success, to reduce
supplies of this raw material to UES.
Energy as instrument of regional
policy and a tool for lobbyists 
Governors who decide local energy prices treat them as their own
political instrument. A common practice applied by regional
authorities is to underprice energy and to write off the power
debts of ÔtheirÕ industrial enterprises. Cheap energy Ð and even
more so, free energy Ð ensures popularity for the regional heads
and guarantees the political support of the largest recipients, to
wit, the industrial plants. Over 60% of the industryÕs debts to
UES come from ÔfriendlyÕ enterprises in those regions whose
heads are the most active in combating the clean-up programme
in Russian power engineering12. Despite avisible improvement in
the situation in 2001, the indebted, worn and torn local electrical
power plants and heat & power stations are still unable to meet
the recipientsÕ demands, particularly in wintertime. Power engi-
neering troubles (long hours of heat and electricity cuts) afflict
many regions and towns of the Far North and the Far East of the
Russian Federation each year13.
On the other hand, cheap energy and manipulation of power
funds (allocation to other needs of local budgets, including in the
local barter trade, non-cash settlements etc.) allow governors to
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regulate the economic and social situation in the regions. The
largest quantities of energy (apart from the already privatised fer-
rous and non-ferrous metallurgy), both nationally and regionally,
are consumed by three subsidised sectors: the public utilities
sector, agriculture and transport, as well as the power industry
itself. The power system is a sort of stabilising element which
makes the sectorsÕ existence possible. The power sector is also
a creditor of the whole economy, including for the most profitable
export branches. All of them use their lobbying possibilities in
order to obtain preferential energy prices. 
The industry which consumes the largest quantities of energy,
non-ferrous metallurgy, demands the largest allowances, and is
usually supported in these demands by the local power elite.
Russki Alumini is only one example. This firm, the largest alu-
minium producer in the Russian Federation, which bought out
considerable shares in the neighbouring water power plants14
owing to its links with the authorities of the Federal Energy
Commission, has had a significant influence on the maintaining
of stable, low energy prices for several years. The attempts made
by RAO UES (as the main shareholder of the local power plants)
to change the management of the regional AO-Energos have
mostly been to no avail. The heads of the Russian regions have
also supported (and still do support) the separatist aspirations of
the companies which are independent or very little dependent on
RAO UES such as Irkutskenergo, Tatenergo or Bashenergo, which
have been boycotting the power monopoly for several years, and
refusing to pay subscription fees for energy transport via the
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Source: www.rao-ees.ru (data from the report for 2000)
Industry (total); incl.:
Fuel
Ferrous metals
Non-ferrous metals
Chemicals and petrochemicals
Machine building and metalworking 
Lumber, pulp and paper
Construction materials 
Light industry 
Food industry 
Other manufacturing industries 
Agriculture
Forestry 
Transport and communications 
Construction
Housing and public utilities, households
Other sectors
Total 
Energy quantity (in bn kWH)
292.6
64.7
47.8
58
34.1
39
10.3
12.2
4.3
7.2
15
25.1
0.3
60
4.9
119.1
86.6
588.6
Share (in %)
49.7
11
8.1
9.9
5.8
6.6
1.7
2.1
0.7
1.2
2.5
4.3
0.1
10.2
0.8
20.2
14.7
100.0
Table 3. Energy consumption in the economy of the Russian Federation,
and the share of each sector in energy consumption in 2000
nationwide grid. In various instances, the courts and even armed
forces of local military units and the OMON15 have participated in
the permanent conflict between UES and the aluminium mag-
nates, local authorities and regional power companies. 
RAO UESR situation
The condition of United Energy Systems of Russia, the company
whose turnover (according to various sources) amounts to
between US$10 and 20bn16, is best shown by the fact that the
power monopoly is one of the largest creditors of the federal bud-
get in Russia, and at the same time a serious debtor.
For many years, electrical energy prices for both the general pub-
lic and the state-financed institutions have not even covered pro-
duction costs. Until now, many local budget bills have not provided
for funds for energy charges; electrical energy meters were in-
stalled for the first time in some households and institutions at
the end of 2000. On the basis of available sources, it is impossi-
ble to estimate the real amount of the debts of energy consumers
(regions, cities, industrial plants etc.) to RAO UES. The one cer-
tain thing is that the largest debtors to the monopoly are the fed-
eral and local budgets, and more precisely the state-financed
institutions (the health service, education, the army etc.) and
their wholesale intermediaries. At the beginning of 2000, the total
debts of domestic recipients for heat and electrical energy
exceeded 26 bn roubles17. However, the results of 2000 show
a favourable change in RAO UESÕ situation. The monopoly man-
aged to collect about 115% of the payments due, including over
80% in cash 18. The surplus accounted for the repayment of part
of the debt. However, this does not mean that the problem of
Ôpower paymentsÕ has been solved. On occasion, the press
reports conflicts between power entrepreneurs and the recipi-
ents. Since the beginning of 2002, RAO UES has cut power sup-
plies to premises owned by the Ministry of Defence of the Russian
Federation; electrical power plants and dispatching stations have
been occupied by armed military units. The Duma was involved
in defending the army against ÔRAO UES aggressionÕ. The power
debts of the Ministry of Defence exceeded 5 bn roubles (as of 
1 March 2000). The debts of the wholesale intermediaries to the
monopoly exceeded 10 bn roubles 19.
Since the establishment of RAO UES in 1992, the prevailing form
of settlements for electrical energy was barter exchange and
money surrogates (bills of exchange, settlement letters etc.) The
share of cash in these operations has been minimal; for example
in 1998 it amounted to little more than 10%20. Similar patterns of
settlements have also been commonly applied in other sectors of
the Russian economy.
In this situation, the results reached by RAO UES under the pre-
sent chairman of the holdingÕs Management Board Anatoly
Chubais21 in the last two years (which after the crisis of August
1998 has also been aperiod of economic growth) can be consid-
ered impressive. In 1999, for the first time after a dozen years of
decrease, both the consumption and production of electrical
energy in Russia rose22.
In 2000, UES significantly reduced the barter exchange and
money surrogates in its settlements. In the second half of 2000,
the share of cash in current payments collected by the monopoly
reached almost 80%; in 2001 it exceeded that amount. Also in
2000, RAO UES started to pay its current tax dues almost in full
for the first time. It would not have been possible to achieve such
results, forcing the recipients to show more payment discipline,
without applying draconian methods to the debtors: power cuts,
property confiscation, blocking bank accounts, initiating bank-
C E S  s t u d i e s
Source: www.eia.doe.gov; *data for USRR 
Production
Consumption
Export
Import
Losses 
1992
964
880
44
27
68
1991*
1607
1475
19,5
0.07
113
1990*
1636
1488
34
1
114.5
1993
913
831
43
25
63.5
1994
808.5
731.5
44
24
56.5
1995
816
739
38
18
57
1996
805
729
32
12
56
1997
794.5
719
27
7
56
1998
786
713
26
8
55
1999
798
728
20
6
56
Table 4. Production and consumption of electrical energy in the former USSR and in Russia in 1990Ð1999 (in bn kWh)
ruptcy proceedings, court cases etc. At the end of 2001, there
were over 100,000 pending cases for repayment of debts brought
by RAO UES before courts of various instances, and several hun-
dreds cases against RAO UES had been filed by institutions that
suffered heat and power cuts23. In this way the moderately popu-
lar head of the monopoly Anatoly Chubais has become the num-
ber one enemy of the regional and industrial elite. However, the
methods he applies may bring only short-term relief to the finan-
cial problems of the Russian power system. 
The long years when the power sector functioned on an almost
cash-less basis resulted in the regrettable condition of its infra-
structure. Most of the electrical power plants and heat & power
stations presently operating in Russia were built in the 1960s.
Since the mid-1980s, the finances for the construction of new
plants and transmission lines have been drastically cut24, and at
the beginning of the 1990s the financing stopped altogether. For
over ten years there have been insufficient funds to modernise
the electrical power plants, transformer stations and grid sys-
tems, and maintenance is restricted to current repairs only.
According to data from RAO UES, the level of equipment wear and
tear in electrical power plants reached nearly 60% (data for
December 2001); the level of wear and tear of transmission lines
and equipment in substations exceeds 40%. Due to the ageing of
power plants, each year sees ever more numerous breakdowns.
The power reserve of electrical engineering system is currently so
low that in many regions it is incapable of meeting peak-time
demand. Without the necessary expenditures, and principally
without reducing the energy consumption rate of the Russian
economy, the pessimistic scenario which many experts have her-
alded regarding the situation of the power sector in the Russian
Federation may come true by 2010: more than half of power
equipment would not work, the RAO UES system will no longer
form acoherent unit (as energy transmission between the regions
will become impossible), and the state will face apower famine25.
According to the RAO UES analystsÕ estimates, the power monop-
oly needs around US$2.5 bn simply to maintain the production of
electrical energy at its current level. The amount of investment
that could prevent technological disaster in the Russian power
sector and ensure its development in the coming years is esti-
mated at US$50Ð70 bn26. Russia does not have such financial
means. The only way to improve the situation and to attract for-
eign capital is to create favourable conditions for investment, and
that means a power market. 
Re f o r m
The vision of a power disaster awaiting Russia Ð a key argument
of the main advocate of radical reform in the sector, RAO UES
head Anatoly Chubais Ð is probably too apocalyptic. Its oppo-
nents question not only the very possibility that the black sce-
nario of the collapse of the Russian power industry will come true,
but also RAO UESÕ own estimates of the amount of expenditure
necessary for maintaining and increasing the energy output. But
it is undeniable that the inefficiency of the natural-resource
monopolies Ð resulting among other things from their wrongly
defined economic role as asponsor of an inefficient, anachronis-
tic economy, and a wrong system of price fixing Ð are a serious
impediment to the currently planned development and moderni-
sation of the state. The highest bodies in the state authorities of
the Russian Federation must be aware of that fact, as is proved
by the consistency and determination with which the government
is taking decisions on reforming the Russian power sector.
On 11 July 2001 Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov accepted the
basic guidelines for reform in the power sector. The cabinetÕs
decision has put an end to the almost year-long struggle over the
future shape of the Russian power sector, which broke out direct-
ly after Anatoly Chubais devised and announced the restructuring
programme for the sector. Almost all elements of state power,
industrial lobbies, regional elites and the most important political
forces took part in the struggle. Each party tried to force through
its own programme for the power reform, which would be
favourable for specific interest groups only. During the debate, the
number of concepts was reduced from a dozen or so to two,
which for the sake of simplicity, might be called the government
concept and the governor concept. The adopted programme, pre-
pared by the minister for economic development German Gref, is
a compromise version of ChubaisÕ concept which includes some
of the postulates put forward by the regional elites and minor
shareholders. Despite a number of concessions, Gref did not give
ground in two of the most basic issues in which the competitive
programmes differed. The main contradiction concerned the
future structure of the Russian power sector. The governors called
for avertical division, that is, the creation of vertically integrated
regional companies which would ensure complete independence
of the power sector27 for the regional authorities of the Russian
Federation. The government opted for a horizontal division Ð the
separation of a monopolistic segment in the power sector, con-
trolled by the state (grid and dispatch services), and areas that
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would function according to market rules (production and trade).
The programme of reforms adopted by the government provided
for the setting up of the Federal Grid Company (FGC), a state
monopoly which was to include the majority of transmission lines
that presently belong to regional AO-Energo companies. The sec-
ond bone of contention was the stock ownership of the future grid
company. The governorsÕ lobby defended minor shareholders and
insisted on the so-called Ômirror distributionÕ of shares, namely
the maintenance of the current proportions of stock ownership in
the FGC: 52% for the state, the rest to be distributed among the
remaining shareholders. The government declared its respect for
the rights of shareholders, and it assured that the process of
including regional mains transmission to the FGC would take
place Ôlawfully, and only according to market-economy methodsÕ
Ð by buyouts or the exchange of shares. 
The differences between the two competitive programmes men-
tioned above quite clearly determine the interests of the parties
and the source of their conflict. In principle, the game is being
played on two intermingling levels: 
1 Ð between the centre which wishes to keep the ÔswitchÕ in its
own hands, and the regions for whom power autonomy would
ensure more independence. Some commentators were even of
the opinion that the authorities would certainly take advantage of
RAO UES reform to crack down on regional separatism; 
2 Ð between reformers (advocates of free market and moder-
nising the domestic economy) and the post-communist political
class (who fear changes and are accustomed to direct, hands-on
control). The choice (in consultation with President Putin) of
GrefÕs concept is one more confirmation of the KremlinÕs central-
ising thrust in its internal policy and of its priority in national
interests. 
According to the programme accepted by the government, any in-
depth restructuring should first of all include RAO UES itself. The
monopoly is to be divided into three independent structures: pro-
duction (electrical power plants and heat & power stations),
trade, and transport (the grid system). After completing the
transformation, the state would take control over the transport
part (transformed into the Federal Grid Company) and the dis-
patch part (Central Dispatch Board or CDB).The remaining areas
(production and trade) would be privatised, and would operate in
conditions of free competition. 
The duration of the reform (8 to 10 years) is divided into three
stages:
The first stage, estimated to take three years, will focus on tidy-
ing-up activities and preparing the power sector to operate
according to free-market rules: a stocktaking and audit of the
whole power engineering property holdings of the Ru s s i a n
Federation, preparing a legal basis and regulations for the func-
tioning of the competitive wholesale market, the creation of
a system of separate financial reports for various types of activ-
ity within the sector, a financial clean-up of the power enterpris-
es, and so on. The result of this stage should be the creation of
conditions for the functioning of acompetitive energy market and
financial transparency in the sector. In the first stage, a horizon-
tal division of RAO UES should also start Ð into the Federal Grid
Company (FGC) and the System Operator (SO Ð the merger of the
Central Dispatch Board and local dispatch board into one sepa-
rate entity). At the end of this stage (by the end of 2004) RAO UES
should undergo natural liquidation. 
The second stage (2Ð3 years) would be devoted to creating
a wholesale and retail energy market, and phasing out the state
from the fixing of prices for electrical energy. The state would fix
only FGC and SO tariffs (transmission and services of the dis-
patch unit). The result of the second stage should be the consol-
idation of market pricing mechanisms in wholesale and retail,
total withdrawal of the state from this process, and the creation
of conditions to attract investment.
The third stage (3Ð4 years) would principally be devoted to
ensuring the inflow of investment capital into the competitive
power sectors, that is, privatisation.
TSA and UTB Ð the start-up of
power reform in Ru s s i a
The Russian governmentÕs intentions of supporting reform have
been quickly confirmed by two other decisions (after the adoption
of the restructuring programme for the power sector), which
aimed at an in-depth market reorientation of the sector while at
the same time maintaining the stateÕs control over the finances
of natural-resource monopolies. At the initiative of the cabinet,
a Trade System Administrator for the wholesale market of electri-
cal energy (TSA) has been established Ð an institution indepen-
dent of the state, whose task will be to create apower market28 in
Russia. The second new body will be aUnified Tariff Body (UTB)29,
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established at Vladimir PutinÕs order and fully subject to the pres-
ident, controlling and co-ordinating the prices of natural-resource
monopolies. 
The TSA is intended be a specific guardian of compliance with
market rules, a co-ordinator of energy exchange which ensures
direct contact between producers and large recipients. One of the
functions of this non-commercial institution would be to offer
help in concluding contracts, supervising settlements, preventing
price manipulation and disputing settlements. Just as had been
the case with the concept of reform in the Russian power sector,
the final decision on the TSAÕs structure is the result of a com-
promise, forced through by the government, between the produc-
ers and the largest recipients of energy. The power within the
body, whose advent will mean the beginning of the process of
market creation, is to be divided equally between both parties30.
This will be an evolutionary process, not a revolutionary one. At
the initial stage, about 15% of energy produced in Russia will
reach the TSA. Until RAO UES is liquidated (in 2004) some part
of the market, particularly supplies to municipal economy and
budgetary institutions, will still be regulated, although prices for
all categories of recipients are to increase gradually, as are the
quantities of energy transferred to the exchange. In the longer
term, the operation of the TSA should significantly change the
shape of the present Russian power market. The advent of the TSA
should also automatically eliminate intermediaries, something to
which certain interest groups are by no means indifferent.
The Unified Tariff Body (UTB) is intended to eliminate the chaos
which has dominated the current national tariff policy, and to take
over the control over prices which so far have been regulated by
various institutions and adopted by the Ministry of Anti-Monopoly
Policy (MAP) 31. The unofficial definition of the UTB as a Ôsuper-
ministry for natural-resource monopoliesÕ reflects the signifi-
cance of this institution. Tariffs of natural-resource monopolies
affect the prices of all other domestic producers, and they are of
fundamental significance for the functioning of the non-raw
materials sector. From the beginning of the reform, the state has
been trying to regain control over them, but the lack of trans-
parency of the monopolies, coupled with their huge lobbying
capabilities, are the reasons why these attempts have so far been
to no avail. The UTBÕs predecessor, the Federal Energy
Commission (FSK), is controlled to a considerable extent by the
aluminium and oil lobbies. In principle, the state has had little
influence on energy price rises in recent years. Yet an increase of
tariffs of any of the monopolies automatically entails an increase
of other monopoliesÕ tariffs, and thus higher inflation32.
It is symptomatic that the presidential decree establishing the
Unified Tariff Body provides neither for the creation of any com-
missions or working groups (as has been the case with the RAO
UES reform programme and the TSA), nor for putting any finish-
ing touches to the concept of the UTB. The guidelines included in
the decree which relate to the structure of this institution and to
the scope of its powers are indisputable. That would confirm the
opinions expressed by many commentators that the tariff body
should not only improve the stateÕs economic policy, but it should
also serve to consolidate presidential power and weaken the
influence of the various lobbies on those economic decisions
which the state intends to have the sole right to take (including
decisions related to the fixing of tariffs). 
The huge resistance encountered whenever an attempt is made
to restructure the most troubled sectors delays the implementa-
tion of reforms and gives them an increasingly compromised
appearance. Proof of the effectiveness of the lobby which resists
power reform lies in the seemingly minor changes introduced to
the already adopted programme, including those changes under-
mining the concept of the state monopoly of the Federal Grid
Company. For example, the FSK will not include a regional distri-
bution grid (the government programme provided for the inclusion
in the FSK of the whole grid on the territory of the Russian
Federation, both high-voltage mains and local grids). Another
amendment allows for the construction and operation of private
electrical grids. Instead of exclusive rights to trade in energy given
to the independent socialised enterprises which was provided for
in the government version of the reform, the new wording of this
point states that the status of supplier can also be granted to
regional AO-Energos. In practice, this means the maintenance of
the local monopoly of regional power companies, and potentially
the maintenance of the existing non-market mechanism.
Nevertheless, owing first of all to the determination of Chubais
and his team, the power reform has already taken its first steps.
Within the framework of the first stage, the stocktaking of prop-
erty of RAO UES and of the regional companies has already been
carried out, the analysis of their financial condition has been con-
ducted, the statutes of the TSA and the Federal Grid Company
have been worked out, and the process of their establishment has
begun. The opening of the wholesale exchange of energy has been
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scheduled for the second half of 200033. The Management Board
has devised and adopted the new organisation of the power sys-
tem34, and has formulated the rules for the functioning of 
the System Operator. In November 2001, the Belgorod Oblast ini-
tiated a pilot project of reforming the regional power companies.
In March 2002 the government adopted apackage of bills neces-
sary to begin the reform35, as devised in RAO UES. RAO UES
experts have worked out a bill on state guarantees for future
investors36 and have submitted it to the government. 
The reform chances
The adoption of the programme for Russian power reform is not
equivalent to a guarantee of its implementation. The course and
the temperature of the debate about the reform of the power
monopoly have demonstrated that this issue concerns not only
the fate of one enterprise but a whole complex of problems, con-
sisting of a combination of the interests of the state, the regions,
hundreds of thousands of economic entities and millions of citi-
zens. Nor are these always common interests. It is aparadox, but
despite an almost universal conviction about the necessity to
restructure the Russian power sector, and despite the adoption of
a specified programme of reform, there is still no social consent
in Russia for the de-monopolisation of RAO UES. The leftist par-
liamentary opposition has been skilfully exploiting that fact. The
natural-resource monopolies Ð meaning cheap or free electricity,
heat, gas and transport Ð are the remains of those social elements
which still gives the citizens a poor substitute for the feeling of
safety; they make the existence of many families possible, and
keep whole regions and economic sectors alive. For this reason,
a common social acceptance of the reform is doubtful. Nor has
the sine qua non condition of every concept of the RAO UES
reform Ð the realignment of energy prices Ð been accepted by the
regional elites or Russian industry, its most influential opponents.
For the governors, their ability to control the ÔswitchÕ is an impor-
tant instrument of their power. If the plan of reform of the Russian
power sector was implemented successfully, and the de- m o n o p o-
lisation and partial privatisation of the sector were carried out,
the network of local arrangements, dependencies and links
between authorities and business circles would suffer consider-
able damage. An important element of these arrangements Ð
a specific element that binds them all Ð is the profit (financial
and political) which is obtained thanks to the availability of cheap
or free forms of energy. For the energy-consuming Russian indus-
try (particularly the steel industry) energy is aprerequisite of their
existence, and cheap energy guarantees profits and competitive -
ness on the world markets. The realignment of energy prices
would mean the inevitable bankruptcy of many industries. The
influence of both parties (the regional elites and the industrial
lobbies) in the Russian parliament extends too far to allow the
smooth adoption of the legislative acts necessary to begin
reforms. 
The possibility of reforming the power system in the Russian
Federation, the reform consistent with the government pro-
gramme, also seems doubtful because of other, no less important
reasons. Firstly, it is quite probable that the central government
and regional authorities will have problems with meeting their
debts (which should increase together with the reduction of hid-
den subsidies). In such asituation, the power sector will have to
continue to bear the costs of part of the state budget liabilities.
Secondly, aconsiderable impediment to implementing the reform
programme is the high energy-consuming rate of the Russian
industry, which consumes over 50% of the energy produced in
the country. The cost of common introduction of energy-saving
technologies is too high for the state, or the owners of large,
already privatised enterprises, to manage on their own.
Furthermore, the availability of cheap energy does not stimulate
anyone to such investments. Thirdly, the investment climate in
Russia is not, at least for the time being, conducive to the inflow
of foreign investment. In the near future the power sector will be
obliged (for social reasons, if for no other) to subsidise unprof-
itable enterprises with cheap energy. Finally the political factor,
and more specifically the parliamentary elections in 2003 and
presidential elections in 2004, will influence the pace of any
changes introduced in the sector. The perspective of the elections
may considerably weaken (at least until 2004) the determination
of the authorities to implement unpopular and socially burden-
some reforms; and realignment of energy or gas prices would cer-
tainly count as one of them. 
Ewa Paszyc 
C E S  s t u d i e s
1 There are 440 thermal power stations and water power plants, and 9 nuclear
power plants in the Russian Federation. RAO UES water power plants generate
63% of energy produced in this type of electrical energy plants on the territory 
of the Russian Federation, thermal power stations Ð 93%. Data from State
Committee of the Russian Federation on Statistics. 
2 RAO UES has ablock of shares, smaller than controlling blocks, in AO
Bashkirenergo (22%); Novosibirskenergo (14%) and Yakutskenergo (34%).
Situation as of 1 January 2000; Interfax-M&CN, Brochure ÒRussian Power
Engineering Sector 2000Ó. 
3 There are presently nine nuclear power stations operating in the Russian
Federation. Eight of them are managed by the state-owned concern
Rosenergoatom, which is part of the Ministry of Nuclear Energy (MinAtom). 
The ninth, the Leningrad Nuclear Power Plant, is subject directly to the Ministry.
Their output varies depending on demand. 
4 The remaining 20% belong to Rosenergoatom.
5 The nuclear power plants were not privatised, and they are state-owned 
enterprises.
6 Recipients are principally large industrial enterprises that have direct access
to the Federal Wholesale Market in Energy and Power (FOREM). The participation
of RAO UES revenues from energy transport in profits before taxation amounts to
over 80%. Interfax-M&CN; Brochure ÔRussian Power Engineering Sector 2000Õ. 
7 Data as of 31 December 2000; www.rao -ees.ru 
8 RAO UES is the organiser and the operator of FOREM.
9 Thanks to the controlling stake that RAO UES has in CAS, the independent
energy producers (Irkutskenergo, Bashenergo, Tatenergo, Rosenergoatom) are in
a worse position because they are ÔtiedÕ to chronically insolvent recipients by
the CAS. The CAS principally sells expensive energy generated in thermal power
stations of RAO UES, and often forces the competitors to limit their production.
10 Data from the State Committee of the Russian Federation on Statistics, 
quoted in the RAO UES report for 1999; www.rao-ees.ru
11 Gas prices in the Russian Federation are three times lower than the prices 
of mazout, and 1.6 times lower than the prices of coal. The price of 1000 m3
of gas for domestic recipients in the second half of 2000 was 440 roubles
(US$11.3) for industry, 289 roubles (about US$9) for the public. At the end 
of 2001 the prices increased to US$15 and US$11/1000 m3. The average prime
costs of gas extraction (without transport costs) amount in Russia to around 
90 roubles/1000 m3. RAO UES uses about 140 bn m3 of gas (data from
www.gazprom.ru and from the statistics of Mezhregiongaz). 
1 2 From the speech made by Anatoly Chubais during hearings in the Duma on the
state of the Russian power engineering industry, January 2001 (www. r a o-ees.ru) 
13 The power engineering disaster in the Primorskii region in 2001 (no electricity
or heat for many weeks of -40¼C in winter 2001) led to social turmoil in the
region and to the resignation of governor Yevgeni Nazdratenko.
14 Russky Alumini concentrates 75% of aluminium industry in the Russian
Federation. It is the second largest producer of aluminium in the world (after
American Alcoa). Energy-consuming aluminium plants are usually built in the
vicinity of water power plants, which generate cheap energy.
15 Military interventions Ð the forced take-over of the headquarters of regional
power engineering companies Ð mostly happen when there is an attempt to
change their management, or in cases of power cuts, particularly to military
premises.
16 Kommersant Vlast Õ (19 December 2000) cites the amount as being between
10 and 15 bn dollars. Other analysts (among them the weekly Ekspert, #17, 
8 May 2000) estimate the value of the so-called Ôfinancial streamsÕ flowing
through RAO UES at not less than 20 bn dollars annually. The data concerns 
the 1999Ð2000 period.
17 Annual report of RAO UES for 2000 (www.rao -ees.ru).
18 Ibid.
19 Interfax, Kommersant (15 March 2002), Vedomosti (13 March 2002) 
and other titles of the central press.
20 www.rao-ees.ru Ð comparative summary of the period 1998-2000.
21 Anatoly Chubais has been the chairman of the Management Board in RAO UES
since 30 April 1998.
22 The increase in the consumption of electrical energy in 1999 (in comparison 
to 1998) was 3%, the increase in production in 2000 was 3.8%. Annual reports
from RAO UES and materials from press agencies.
23 Kommersant, 7 February 2002. 
24 The amount allocated for this purpose in the federal budget in 1999 was lower
by 80% in comparison to 1990 (Novoye Vrema, #13/1998).
25 Including Vladimir Kartenko, the president of the Committee for Power
Engineering of the State Duma. From the text of the speech made during 
parliamentary hearings on the condition of the Russian power industry,
January 2001.
26 The estimates of ateam of analysts in the Troika-Dialog investment company,
presented at the conference ÔElectrical power engineering as abasis for 
a stable economic developmentÕ Moscow, 7 December 2000; (Vedomosti,
8 December 2000). 
27 The governors insisted on dividing the whole power engineering system for
autonomous territorial units, which would concentrate production, transport,
energy distribution and trade in the regions they govern.
28 Administrator Torgovoi Sistemy. This body, according to the programme of the
reform, should start to operate in the first quarter of 2002. 
29 Yediny Tarifny Organ, established by apresidential decree of 4 September
2001, is to start operation after the amendment and passing of the appropriate
laws. 
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30 In the initial period, the power engineering monopoly will dominate in the TSA
Management Board. 50% of the votes will be held by RAO UES and the regional
companies constituting the holding, 50% by other market operators, including
Rosenergoatom and the Russky Alumini concern. The balance is to be ensured
by the mode of decision-taking in the TSA (a two-thirds majority). Together with
the gradual liquidation of the monopoly, the participation of RAO UES in the TSA
Management Board will decline. In the initial period the state, which will have
no shares in TSA, is to supervise the process.
31 Tariffs are presently controlled by: the Ministry of Transport (railway tariffs,
sea transport, river transport, air transport, transport terminal rates etc.); 
the Federal Energy Commission Ð RAO UES tariffs and gas prices; and the
Government Commission for Export Coordination Ð charges for oil and gas
transport; regional power engineering commissions and executive bodies of local
authorities Ð municipal tariffs (heating, water, sewage system, etc.). The role of
all these institutions boils down mostly to the initialling of individual contracts
between monopolies (for example agreements between RAO UES and Gazprom
on how much the gas and electrical energy prices will increase, or between RAO
UES and MPS on tariffs for coal transport). The UTB is also to take over 
the control over prices of regional natural monopolies, principally of local power
engineering companies. 
32 For example, the increase of electrical energy prices by 30% leads to 
a one-off increase of inflation by around 3 percentage points. This is 
additionally related to the necessity to compensate the general public for t
he price increase (calculations of the State Committee of the Russian Federation
on Statistics, Vedomosti, 30 August 2001).
33 In the transition period, the regulated market and competitive market will
operate simultaneously; different systems of price fixing and settlements will be
applied to each of them. In both cases the TSA will eliminate the practice of
Ôcross-subsidiesÕ.
34 A standard project of reforming the regional power engineering companies 
provides for the division of regional companies into the production part 
and the grid part, and also provides for the establishment of territorial 
generating companies through amerger (under acommon management) of
energy producers in three to five neighbouring regions (provided that it is in
compliance with admissible indices of market concentration) and grid 
companies within the present 7 joint power engineering systems: Centre,
Northern Caucasus, Middle-Volga, North West, Ural, Siberia, East.
35 These include the following bills: ÔOn Electrical Power EngineeringÕ; 
ÔOn the Regulation of Prices for Heat Energy and Electrical EnergyÕ; 
ÔOn Nationwide Electrical GridÕ; ÔOn Competition and Limits to Monopolistic
Activity in Commodity MarketsÕ; ÔOn Energy EconomyÕ; the changes 
and supplement to the law ÔOn Natural MonopoliesÕ and to the second part of
the Civil Code. In April 2002 the package is to be submitted to the Duma, where,
in the opinion of minister German Gref, their authors will face afierce struggle. 
36 In February 2002 the bill was submitted to the government. The UES proposes
to create anon-commercial structure, the Investment Guarantees Fund, which
would be managed by the state. RAO UES is currently negotiating with potential
investors.
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